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Improving the Design of Pell Grant Award Rules 
by FrederlckJ. Fischer Two major allocation devices determine award amounts in the 
student aid programs authorized in Title IV of the Higher Education 
Act (HEA). One is the determination of a student's need using "need 
analysis" procedures; the other is the calculation of a Pelt Grant 
award using statutorily specified Pelt Grant award rules. 
Improving the Design 
of Pell Grant Award 
Rules 
At the time of his death in 
September 1990, Fred Fischer 
was a budget examiner with 
responsibility for student aid 
programs at the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget. The 
views expressed in this article 
were the personal views of 
the author. They do not 
represent, nor should they be 
construed as, an official 
position of the Office of 
Management and Budget. 
The author wished to 
thank Art Hauptman, Dan 
Madzelan, Maureen 
McLaughlin, Laurent Ross, 
and Barry White for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of 
this article. 
A lthough need analysis provisions have been subjected to sub-stantial, systematic, and ongoing analysis for many years, there does not appear to have been any equally rigorous attention to 
the effects of Pell Grant award rules. This article develops criteria 
with which to evaluate any set of award rules and uses these equity 
notions to review current rules. These rules are found to be deficient 
in several respects. An alternative set of rules is proposed that would 
remedy some of the major equity problems. The article concludes by 
exploring the possibility of designing a single, general award rule for 
determining Pell Grant awards. 
There are two devices for allocating aid to students in the student aid 
programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act 
(HEA). The first device is "need analysis," a statutorily specified 
approach to determining what a family is expected to contribute 
toward college charges (the expected family contribution [EFC]) and 
what those allowable charges are (the cost of attendance (COAJ). 
One need analysis approach is employed for the Pell Grant Program; 
another, somewhat different, is employed for the Guaranteed Stu-
dent Loan ( GSL) and so-called campus-based programs. 
The second device is a set of statutorily specified award rules in 
the Pell Grant Program, at about $5 billion a year the largest federal 
student aid subsidy. In particular, a given student's Pell Grant award 
is defined to be the minimum of amounts calculated under each of 
three different award rules. 
Need analysis provisions have been the subject of considerable 
analysis and debate, often in excruciating and eye-glazing detail, on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds. A number of provisions in 
both Pell Grant and general need analysis approaches have been 
added, dropped, or revised over the years as a result of these discus-
sions. In other words, a strong analytical tradition undergirds this 
allocative device. 
Pell Grant award rules, however, appear to have been given little 
or no systematic attention: there does not seem to be any discussion 
of the rules anywhere in the published literature. Nor have the rules 
themselves changed in any conceptually significant way. They are 
today largely as they were when the program (then titled the Basic 
Educational Opportunity Grant [BEOG] program) was enacted in the 
early 1970s. This lack of analytical attention or revision is all the more 
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curious because many student aid administrators and others in the 
higher education community seem to disfavor the rules. 
The basis for this disfavor is not entirely clear, and may well be 
different for different commentators. In any case, this inchoate dis-
content, combined with the absence of any systematic analysis of the 
effect of award rules on the distribution of Pell Grant aid, suggests 
that an exploratory study is in order. The purposes of this study are 
(a) to see how the current award rules stack up against some simple 
notions of equity and fairness in award allocation and (b) to consider 
some alternative rules that might lead to improved equity in Pell 
Grant allocations. 
It is important to keep in mind that the Pell Grant Program does 
not exist in a program vacuum; a variety of other Title IV student aid 
programs, particularly the Guaranteed Student Loan program, also 
make aid available to students, not to mention State and institutional 
aid. Because in these programs (a) award rules are much less impor-
tant in determining awards and are more straightforward and (b) 
financial aid administrators have discretion in determining aid eligi-
bility, one might assume that these dollars tend to be allocated to 
offset any anomalies or problems created by Pell Grant award rules 
and that, therefore, reviewing Pell rules is not a worthwhile exercise. 
On the other hand, only a relatively few of these non-Pell Grant 
aid dollars are grant dollars-most are loans. Since the attractiveness 
and/or real economic value to the student of these benefits is much 
less than grants, it is useful to review how Pell Grant award rules 
distribute Pell Grant aid. Further, there is some suggestion that aid 
administrators frequently distribute campus-based federal aid, not to 
mention institutional aid, in ways that do not support Pell Grant 
Program goals. To the extent this is true, ensuring the appropriate-
ness and efficacy of Pell Grant award rules is all the more important. 
Finally, the structure of Pell Grant award rules will become more 
important if a larger share of federal student aid subsidies is deliv-
ered through this program, a distinct possibility of the upcoming 
HEA reauthorization. 
The first section of this article develops the criteria by which to 
evaluate the operation of award rules, with particular attention to the 
distinction between income-testing and need-testing. The next sec-
tion describes the structure of and rationale for current Pell Grant 
rules, with a subsequent section evaluating these rules against the 
criteria just mentioned. The following section reviews a couple of 
familiar alternatives to the percent-of-cost award rule. The next sec-
tion investigates a general alternative to current award rules. The 
final section summarizes results and suggests some avenues for fur-
ther research. 
A more mathematically rigorous analysis of the arguments is 
provided in footnotes. 
Income Targeting vs. Need Targeting; Access vs. Choice 
Determination of need in the student aid world differs from that in 
federal assistance programs: income itself (or, to be more precise, its 
absence) is not the measure of need. In the AFDC program, for 
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example, the benefit in each State depends essentially on the amount 
of income earned by the family: what the recipient gets is deter-
mined by how much income he doesn't have. 
Similarly, in the food stamp program, the benefit in each state 
depends on the recipient's income, not on the cost of groceries at the 
local supermarket. Although the food stamp benefit level presum-
ably is set with some notion of food costs in mind, the level, once set, 
does not depend on the recipient's choice of where to obtain food. It 
is up to the recipient to optimize his food selection given the food 
stamp benefit for which he is eligible. 
In student aid, on the other hand, need is defined as the cost of 
attendance (COA) minus the expected family contribution (EFC, an 
amount essentially, although not entirely, based on income). The 
recipient makes his college selection and then his need is deter· 
mined, given that selection. 
Whether or not one views this cost-including definition of need 
as appropriate has a great deal to do with how one views the ade· 
quacy of Pell Grant award rules. Because of the importance of the 
distinction, and because there are strong views on both sides, we will 
employ evaluative criteria from both sides, so to speak. 
Another closely related way of expressing this difference is to 
discuss access to education vs. choice of school. Access may be 
thought of as corresponding to the EFC "dimension" of need deter-
mination, while choice may be thought of as corresponding to the 
COA "dimension" of need determination. In this framework, income 
targeting would aim at ensuring access by providing a benefit related 
to EFC, but perhaps not to COA, while need targeting would aim at 
ensuring choice by providing a benefit related to COA, but perhaps 
not to EFC (except to the obvious extent that aid could not exceed 
COA minus EFC). 
Criterion 1: Relation of Award to EFC 
Most people would probably agree that, holding GOA constant, a 
student's award should decrease as his EFC increases. That is, at a 
given school, if he can afford to pay more, he should get less aid. 1 
This is the basic income-targeting, access-oriented criterion. 
Criterion 2: Relation of Award to COA 
How should the student's award vary with costs, holding EFC con· 
stant? This is the basic need-targeting question. Those who favor a 
cost-excluding definition of need naturally believe that, at least after 
some COA level, awards at a given EFC should not increase with 
costs or should do so only very slowly. 
Those who favor a cost-including definition of need believe that 
awards should increase with COA, but of course never at a rate 
greater than dollar-for-dollar (i.e., awards should never increase 
faster than cost). This is the basic need-targeting, choice-oriented 
criterion. 2 
There are strong arguments on both sides. On the side of cost· 
excluders is the strong equity argument that available resources 
should be allocated so that the maximum number of poor recipients 
have the opportunity to secure a decent postsecondary education. 
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There is also a cost-constraint argument that making awards invariant 
(or only slightly variant) with respect to costs avoids subsidizing 
price increases by colleges. 
On the side of the cost-includers is a strong equity argument that 
poor students who are able to gain admission to higher cost schools 
should not be barred from attendance on financial grounds; implicit 
here is the assumption that price and quality are positively corre-
lated. This equity argument also has an efficiency component: allow-
ing awards to vary with costs permits a better sorting of student 
abilities by college quality, optimizing society's return on the invest-
ment of resources in postsecondary education. 
Criterion 3: Relation of Award, Expressed as a Percent of 
Need, to EFC >-
Consider the award as a fraction of the student's need (i.e., COA 
minus EFC). This is the percent of need that the award meets. How 
should this percent vary with EFC, holding COA constant? Certainly 
the percent of need met should not increase with EFC, and perhaps 
should decrease slowly (i.e., holding COA constant, meet a lower 
percent of need for better-off students).3·4 
Criterion 4: Relation of Award, Expressed as a Percent of 
Need, toCOA 
How should the percent of need met vary with COA, holding EFC 
constant? Again, certainly the percent of need met should not in-
crease with cost, and should perhaps decrease slowly (i.e., holding 
EFC constant, meet a lower percent of need for students at higher 
cost schools). s 
A student is entitled to a Pell Grant award which is the minimum of 
amounts generated by three award rules: 
1. A maximum award minus EFC (HEA section 411(b)(2)); 
2. 60 percent of COA (section 411(b)(3)); and 
3. COA minus EFC (section 4ll(b)(4)). 
(There is also a minimum award that may vary depending on 
whether or not the program is fully funded. If the minimum amount 
generated by the three award rules is less than the minimum award, 
the student's award is $0. Fortunately, for the purposes of this article, 
we can ignore the minimum award rule without any loss of generality 
in our conclusions.) 
Maximum Award Minus EFC 
The maximum award amount is specified in statute but is regularly 
overridden in appropriations language. The maximum for 1991-92 is 
$2,400. (In the calculations here, the award is $2,300 maximum.) 
About two-thirds of Pel! Grant awards are now determined under this 
award rule, which is not found in other Title IV programs. [A close 
cousin was enacted in the Supplemental Educational Opportunity 
Grant (SEOG) program in 1986 HEA amendments. See HEA section 
413C(c)(2).) Under this rule, no student with an EFC greater than the 
maximum6 can get a Pell Grant award, regardless of his COA and, 
therefore, his need. Further, there comes a point in the COA beyond 
which awards become invariant with regard to COA because of this 
rule. 
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This award rule therefore (a) ensures very strong income target-
ing of Pell Grant aid (while ensuring very weak need targeting, 
particularly at higher cost schools) and (b) puts a cap (i.e., the 
maximum) on Pell Grant aid available at higher cost schools, regard-
less of a student's need. The rule strongly reflects a view of Pell Grant 
aid as a resource intended to provide basic postsecondary access for 
low EFC (and income) students. Under this view, the maximum 
should provide enough aid to permit the poorest student to be able 
to afford some type of postsecondary educational experience. 
Percent of COA 
For many years the percent-of-cost cap was 50 percent, but it was 
raised to 60 percent by the mid-1980s in response to intense public 
school lobbying. About one-third of Pell Grant awards are now deter-
mined under this rule, which is not found in other Title IV programs. 
Under this rule, no student can get a Pell Grant award greater than 60 
percent of the COA, regardless of his EFC and, therefore, his need. 
This rule has been justified on political grounds as necessary to 
gain support for the program from higher cost, more often private, 
colleges. Without the rule, lower cost, more often public schools, 
might become virtually free to many Pell Grant recipients, undercut-
ting the competitive position of the higher cost schools. 
The rule has also been justified on policy grounds that only a 
portion of a student's college costs should be met with grants, that 
the student is the major future beneficiary of his postsecondary edu-
cation and should therefore bear part of its costs through borrowing 
and work, in addition to any past resources he is able to contribute 
toward these costs. 
COA minus EFC 
This common sense rule states that a student's award may not exceed 
his need. Only about one percent of Pell Grant awards are now 
determined under this rule, which is also found in all other need-
tested Title IV programs. 
Table 1 displays both absolute Pell Grant awards (first set of col-
umns) and the percent of need met by those awards (second set of 
columns) for a variety of COA and EFC combinations. (The tables 
here assume a $2,300 maximum Pell Grant because they were con-
structed before the increase to $2,400.) In cases when EFC is greater 
than or equal to COA (i.e., when there is no need), the table entry is 
blank. The award calculation uses current Pell Grant award rules, 
ignoring the minimum award rule. Thus, for example, the award for a 
student with an EFC of $250 and a cost of $1,000 is $600, determined 
by the percent-of-cost rule. This award is 80 percent of his need of 
$1,000 minus $250, or $750 (i.e., $600 is 80 percent of $750). 
How well do these awards satisfy the evaluation criteria? First, 
they violate criterion 1-howawards vary with EFC, with the desired 
outcome that awards decline with EFC increases-for certain COA 
and EFC combinations. As the upper box in the award section of 
Table 1 highlights, awards at lower cost schools do not decline as 
EFC increases, for lower EFC students. This occurs because the per-
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TABLE 1 
Pell Awards Calculated Using Current Award Rules: M -~,!;;-~.and~ 
Calculation of Award Calculation of Award/Need 
6 Cost EFC EFC -- 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 2750 r"" 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
N 250 150 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
;--' 500 300 250 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
z 750 450 450 250 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.90 ao NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1000 600 600 500 250 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1250 750 750 750 500 250 NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
!"' 
1500 900 900 900 750 500 250 NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.72 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1750 1050 1050 1050 1000 750 500 250 NA NA NA 0.60 0.70 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA 
(f) 2000 1200 1200 1200 1200 1000 750 500 250 NA NA 0.60 0.69 0.80 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA '"'d 2250 1350 1350 1350 1350 1250 1000 750 500 250 NA 0.60 0.68 0.77 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA :;l:i 2500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.60 0.67 0.75 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.73 0.60 0.20 NA NA ...... z 2750 1650 1650 1650 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.60 0.66 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.70 0.64 0.55 0.40 0.10 0.00 NA 
Cl 3000 1800 1800 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.60 0.65 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.60 0.53 0.44 0.30 0.07 0.00 0.00 
3250 1950 1950 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.58 0.53 0.46 0.37 0.24 0.05 0.00 0.00 ,.... 
3500 2100 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.31 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.00 \0 
\0 3750 2250 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.28 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.00 ,.... 4000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.00 
4250 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.54 0.51 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.22 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.00 
4500 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.20 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.00 
4750 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 
5000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 
5250 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 
5500 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 
5750 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 
6000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 
6250 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 
6500 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 
6750 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 
7000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 
7250 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 
7500 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.05 O.Q1 0.00 0.00 
7750 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
8000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
8250 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
8500 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
8750 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 
9000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 
9250 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 
9500 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.04 0,01 0.00 0.00 
9750 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 
10000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 
~ 
Some Alternatives to 
the Percent-of-Cost Rule 
cent-of-cost rule is determining awards, so that they do not vary with 
EFC.7 
Second, although the awards do not strictly violate criterion 2-
how awards vary with COA, with the desired outcome that awards 
remain unchanged or increase as COA increases-they certainly 
strain it. As the lower box in the award section highlights, awards 
over a very wide cost range do not vary at all with cost. This occurs 
because the maximum minus EFC rule is determining awards, so that 
they are not affected by costs.8 
Third, criterion 3-how the percent of need met varies with 
EFC, with the desired outcome that the percent of need met is 
unchanged or declines as EFC increases-is violated. Figure 1 dis-
plays the boxed data in the percent-of-need-met section of Table 1, 
graphing the percent of need met against EFC for four different COAs 
($2,250, $2,500, $2,750, and $3,000). 
Some very strange things are going on here. The percent of need 
met initially rises with ability to pay (i.e., EFC), clearly violating 
criterion 3. This is because the percent-of-cost rule is holding the 
award constant as EFC increases (and need consequently falls). 
Since need is falling with the award remaining constant, the percent 
of need met by the award increases.9 
In the case of COA equal to $2,250, the percent rises to 100 when 
the cost minus EFC award rule becomes determinative (i.e., the 
award is then cost minus EFC, so that the percent of need met is by 
definition 100). It remains unchanged with further increases in EFC 
because the award of cost minus EFC continues to equal 100 percent 
of need. 10 
In the case of the other COA levels, the percent of need met rises 
but then falls with increasing rapidity because both the numerator of 
the fraction (i.e., the award) and the denominator (i.e., need) are 
decreasing dollar-for-dollar. 11 Note that for COA equal to $3,000, the 
percent of need met falls to 0 and remains there until need disap-
pears because the maximum minus EFC rule has driven the award to 
$0.12 
Thus, under current award rules, the percent of need met by a 
Pell Grant can, in addition to decreasing as EFC increases, (a) in-
crease with EFC, (b) stay constant at 100 percent of EFC as EFC 
increases at lower cost schools, or (c) stay constant at 0 percent of 
EFC as EFC increases at higher cost schools. 
Finally, criterion 4-how the percent of need met varies with 
cost, with the desired outcome that percent of need remains un-
changed or declines as COA increases-is generally satisfied, as we 
can see by scanning the percent-of-need-met columns in Table 1. 
In summary, current award rules violate criteria 1 and 3, strain 
criterion 2, and generally satisfy criterion 4. Scarcely impressive. 
How might we do better? 
The violations of criteria 1 and 3 are caused by the percent-of-cost 
rule, so it seems reasonable to attack this problem first. The basic 
problem, of course, is that the rule does not take EFC into account. 
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One alternative approach that has been suggested, notably during 
the Reagan Administration in several student aid budget proposals, is 
to replace the rule with percent of cost minus EFC. That is, the rule 
would change from pC, where Cis the COA and pis the percent of 
cost covered, to pC - E, where E is the EFC. Since this alternative is 
less than COA minus EFC, using this alternative essentially replaces 
the three current rules with two (i.e., maximum minus EFC and 
percent of cost minus EFC). 
Table 2 displays awards under this award rule regime. Looking at 
the awards themselves, we see that the violation of criterion 1 has 
been removed: holding COA constant, awards now decline as EFC 
increases. 13 And looking at the percent of need met, we see that the 
violation of criterion 3 has also been removed: holding COA con-
stant, the percent of need met now declines as EFC increases. 14 
However, a closer look at the percent-of-need-met section of the 
table indicates that a new problem has emerged. Criterion 4 is now 
violated. Over a broad range of EFCs, at lower cost schools, the 
percent of need met increases with COA, holding EFC constant. 15 
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Can we eliminate the violations of criteria 1 and 3 in some other 
fashion that doesn't violate criterion 4? 
Another alternative that has been suggested, notably by the Ford 
and Carter Administrations, is to replace the percent-of-cost rule with 
a percent-of-need rule. That is, replace pC with p(C- E). As with the 
percent of cost minus EFC rule, the percent of need is always less 
than total need (i.e., cost minus EFC), so the three current rul~s 
would again be collapsed into two (i.e., maximum minus EFC and 
percent of need). Table 3 presents award calculations based on this 
regime. 
As we can see by looking at the award section, criterion 1 is not 
violated. 16 And, looking at the percent-of-need-met section, both 
criteria 3 and criteria 4 are strictly satisfied, albeit at the price of 
making the percent of need met invariant over a wide range of COA 
and EFC levels. 17 None of the criteria is violated under this award 
rule regime. Making this single award rule change would thus im-
prove equity in the award of Pell grants substantially. 
Uneasiness remains with the distribution of awards even after adopt-
ing the percent-of-need rule, however. The maximum minus EFC 
rule continues to limit strictly awards at high cost schools and to 
eliminate awards for high income (i.e., high EFC) students who have 
need by virtue of attending high cost schools. One would like to 
increase need-targeting of the Pell Grant Program somewhat without 
sacrificing too much in the way of income-targeting. 
To put it differently, is there an award rule that satisfies all of the 
fairness criteria without putting an arbitrary cap on the Pell Grant 
award that hurts low income students who would like to go to high 
cost schools and without denying all aid to high-income students 
who nonetheless have need? Is such a general, single-rule solution 
possible? 
What we are after is basically a percent-of-need rule in which the 
percent of need met changes with COA and EFC, decreasing as 
either COA or EFC increases. Consider a rule under which the award 
is equal to 
[g-(g-1) (C+E) J(C ~), 
- - - (C* + E*) -
where g is the greatest percent of need to be covered, 1 is the least 
percent of need to be covered, and C* and E* are, respectively, the 
maximum COA and EFC levels over which the operation of the rule 
is defined. The percent of need met by the Pell Grant award is 
maximized (at g percent) when C and E are $0 and minimized (at 1 
percent) when C + E = C* + E*. -
Table 4 presentsaward calculations using this rule assuming that 
C* and E* are both equal to $20,000, with g = .23 and I = 0. (One 
could, of course, set these variables, particularly cost, well within the 
range of current postsecondary charges. One would then have to 
establish some rule for determining awards beyond this range. To 

















































































































































Pell Awards Calculated Using M ·~and m;: · ~Rules 
Calculation of Award Calculation of Award/Need 
EFC EFC 
750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.20 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.40 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.47 0.20 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
0 0 NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA 
150 0 0 NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.52 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.00 NA NA NA NA 
300 50 0 0 NA NA NA 0.60 0.53 0.44 0.30 0.07 0.00 0.00 NA NA NA 
450 200 0 0 0 NA NA 0.60 0.54 0.47 0.36 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA NA 
600 350 100 0 0 0 NA 0.60 0.55 0.49 0.40 0.28 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA 
750 500 250 0 0 0 0 0.60 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.33 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
900 650 400 150 0 0 0 0.60 0.56 0.51 0.45 0.37 0.27 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1050 800 550 300 50 0 0 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.31 0.20 0.04 0.00 0.00 
1200 950 700 450 200 0 0 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.48 0.42 0.35 0.26 0.13, 0.00 0.00 
1350 1100 850 600 350 100 0 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.49 0.44 0.38 0.30 0.20 0.07 0.00 
1500 1250 1000 750 500 250 0 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.33 0.25 0.14 0.00 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.03 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.54 0.51 0.48 0.44 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.22 0.13 0.03 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.20 0.12 0.02 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.02 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.02 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.02 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.09 0.02 
1550 . 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.38 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.13 O.OB 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.33 0.30 0.2B 0.25 0.22 0.1B 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.2B 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.1B 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.1B 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 
1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.01 
TABLE3 
PeU Awards Calculated Using M ·~and R (~ · ~) Rules 
Calculation of Award Calculation of Award/Need 
Cost EFC EFC 
'-< --0 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 c 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
:::0 250 150 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
~ 500 300 150 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 750 450 300 150 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.60 0.60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
t'"' 1000 600 450 300 150 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
0 1250 750 600 450 300 150 NA NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 NA NA NA NA NA 
'TJ 1500 900 750 600 450 300 150 NA NA NA NA 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 NA NA NA NA 
CfJ 1750 1050 900 750 600 450 300 150 NA NA NA 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 NA NA NA ,.., 2000 1200 1050 900 750 600 450 300 150 NA NA 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 NA NA c 2250 1350 1200 1050 900 750 600 450 300 150 NA 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 NA 
t.J 2500 1500 1350 1200 1050 900 750 600 450 300 50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.20 
t:rJ 2750 1650 1500 1350 1200 1050 900 750 550 300 50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.40 0.10 z 3000 1BOO 1650 1500 1350 1200 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.53 0.44 0.30 0.07 ,.., 3250 1950 1BOO 1650 1500 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.5B 0.53 0.46 0.37 0.24 0.05 
'TJ 3500 2100 1950 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.40 0.31 0.20 0.04 - 3750 2250 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.2B 0.17 0.03 
~ 
4000 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.5B 0.55 0.51 0.4B 0.43 0.3B 0.32 0.24 0.15 0.03 
4250 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.54 0.51 0.4B 0.44 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.22 0.13 0.03 
4500 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.51 0.4B 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.20 0.12 0.02 (') 4750 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.4B 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.11 0.02 ,_, 
> 5000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.2B 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.02 
t'"' 5250 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.44 0.41 0.3B 0.34 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.16 0.09 0.02 
> 5500 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.09 0.02 - 5750 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.01 t.J 6000 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.3B 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.1B 0.13 O.OB 0.01 
6250 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.2B 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.01 
6500 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.01 
6750 2300 2050 1800 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.01 
7000 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.33 0.30 0.2B 0.25 0.22 0.1B 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.01 
7250 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.1B 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.01 
7500 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.31 0.2B 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.01 
7750 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.01 
8000 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.01 
B250 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.1B 0.15 0.12 O.OB 0.05 0.01 
B500 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11 O.OB 0.05 0.01 
8750 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.11 O.OB 0.04 0.01 
9000 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.11 O.OB 0.04 0.01 
9250 2300 2050 1BOO 1500 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.1B 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 
9500 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 BOO 550 300 50 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.1B 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 
...... 9750 2300 2050 1BOO 1550 1300 1050 800 550 300 50 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 




















Pell Awards Calculated Using [S- (s-!) (~+~)I(~*+~*)](~-~) Rule 




1000 224 111 
1500 332 219 108 
2000 437 323 213 105 
2500 539 426 315 207 102 
3000 638 525 414 306 201 99 
3500 735 621 510 403 298 196 96 
4000 828 714 604 496 391 289 190 93 
4500 919 805 694 587 482 380 280 184 91 
5000 1006 893 782 674 569 467 368 272 178 88 
5500 1091 978 867 759 654 552 453 357 263 173 85 
6000 1173 1059 949 841 736 634 535 438 345 254 167 82 
6500 1252 1139 1028 920 815 713 614 518 424 334 246 161 79 
7000 1328 1215 1104 996 891 789 690 594 500 410 322 237 155 76 
7500 1402 1288 1177 1070 965 863 763 667 574 483 395 311 229 150 73 
8000 1472 1358 1248 1140 1035 933 834 737 644 553 466 381 299 220 144 70 
8500 1540 1426 1315 1208 1103 1001 901 805 712 621 533 449 367 288 211 138 68 
9000 1604 1491 1380 1272 1167 1065 966 870 776 686 598 513 431 352 276 203 132 65 
9500 1666 1553 1442 1334 1229 1127 1028 932 838 748 660 575 493 414 338 265 194 127 62 
10000 1725 1611 1501 1393 1288 1186 1087 990 897 806 719 634 552 473 397 323 253 185 121 59 
10500 1781 1668 1557 1449 1344 1242 1143 1047 953 863 775 690 608 529 453 380 309 242 177 115 56 
11000 1834 1721 1610 1502 1397 1295 1196 1100 1006 916 828 743 661 582 506 433 362 295 230 168 109 53 
11500 1885 1771 1660 1553 1448 1346 1246 1150 1057 966 878 794 712 633 556 483 413 345 280 219 160 104 50 
12000 1932 1818 1708 1600 1495 1393 1294 1197 1104 1013 926 841 759 680 604 530 460 392 328 266 207 151 98 47 
12500 1977 1863 1752 1645 1540 1438 1338 1242 1149 1058 970 886 804 725 648 575 505 437 372 311 252 196 142 92 45 
13000 2018 1905 1794 1686 1581 1479 1380 1284 1190 1100 1012 927 845 766 690 617 546 479 414 352 293 237 184 134 86 42 
13500 2057 1944 1833 1725 1620 1518 1419 1323 1229 1139 1051 966 884 805 729 656 585 518 453 391 332 276 223 173 125 81 39 
14000 2093 1979 1869 1761 1656 1554 1455 1358 1265 1174 1087 1002 920 841 765 691 621 553 489 427 368 312 259 208 161 116 75 36 
14500 2126 2013 1902 1794 1689 1587 1488 1392 1298 1208 1120 1035 953 874 798 725 654 587 522 460 401 345 292 242 194 150 108 69 33 
15000 2156 2043 1932 1824 1719 1617 1518 1422 1328 1238 1150 1065 983 904 828 755 684 617 552 490 431 375 322 272 224 180 138 99 63 30 
15500 2184 2070 1959 1852 1747 1645 1545 1449 1356 1265 1177 1093 1011 932 855 782 712 644 579 518 459 403 349 299 252 207 165 127 91 58 27 
16000 2208 2094 1984 1876 1771 1669 1570 1473 1380 1289 1202 1117 1035 956 880 806 736 668 604 542 483 427 374 323 276 231 190 151 115 82 52 24 
16500 2230 2116 2005 1898 1793 1691 1591 1495 1402 1311 1223 1139 1057 978 901 828 758 690 625 564 505 449 395 345 298 253 211 173 137 104 73 46 22 
17000 2248 2135 2024 1916 1811 1709 1610 1514 1420 1330 1242 1157 1075 996 920 847 776 709 644 582 523 467 414 364 316 272 230 191 155 122 92 65 40 19 
17500 2264 2151 2040 1932 1827 1725 1626 1530 1436 1346 1258 1173 1091 1012 936 863 792 725 660 598 539 483 430 380 332 288 246 207 171 138 108 81 56 35 16 
18000 2277 2163 2053 1945 1840 1738 1639 1542 1449 1358 1271 1186 1104 1025 949 875 805 737 673 611 552 496 443 392 345 300 259 220 184 151 121 93 69 47 29 13 
18500 2287 2174 2063 1955 1850 1748 1649 1553 1459 1369 1281 1196 1114 1035 959 886 815 748 683 621 562 506 453 403 355 311 269 230 194 161 131 104 79 58 39 23 10 
19000 2294 2181 2070 1962 1857 1755 1656 1560 1466 1376 1288 1203 1121 1042 966 893 822 755 690 628 569 513 460 410 362 318 276 237 201 168 138 111 86 65 46 30 17 
19500 2299 2185 2074 1967 1862 1760 1660 1564 1471 1380 1292 1208 1126 1047 970 897 827 759 694 633 574 518 464 414 367 322 280 242 206 173 142 115 91 69 50 35 22 12 
20000 2300 2186 2076 1968 1863 1761 1662 1565 1472 1381 1294 1209 1127 1048 972 898 828 760 696 634 575 519 466 415 368 323 282 243 207 174 144 116 92 70 52 36 23 13 
"The lack of analytical 
attention to the impact 
of these award rules 
suggested the need for 
a systematic review of 
how these rules 
operate." 
keep things simple, we use here a C* level just beyond current 
maximum prices.) These values were chosen to generate a Pell Grant 
award for COA of $20,000 and EFC of $0 equal to what current award 
rules provide for this COA/EFC combination (i.e., $2,300). Note that 
once a particular COA/EFC combination award value is chosen (in 
this case, at COA equals $20,000 and EFC = $0), the maximum value 
of g is determined. Table 5 presents corresponding calculations of 
percent of need met. 
Ideally, of course, one would like to be able to choose g so that 
total program costs would be the same as those under the-current 
award rules. One could then compare award outcomes under the two 
regimes and see who loses and who gains under the rule change, 
holding total costs constant. Unfortunately, no current cost estima-
tion model appears to exist that can handle this simulation. The so-
called Cross Program Model under development at the Department 
of Education may eventually allow such estimation. 
As we can see by inspection of Tables 4 and 5, this award rule 
creates awards that satisfy strictly all of the evaluation criteria: (a) 
awards decrease as EFC increases, holding COA constant, and in-
crease as COA increases, holding EFC constant; and (b) percent of 
need met decreases as EFC increases, holding COA constant, and 
decreases as COA increases, holding EFC constant. 18 
Unfortunately, this improvement in need targeting is purchased 
at the substantial expense of income targeting. Table 6 shows the 
change in award due to moving from awards calculated under the 
maximum minus EFC, percent-of-need regime (see Table 3) and 
awards calculated under the general rule (see Table 4). To highlight 
changes in awards, changes of $500 or less have been suppressed; 
the affected COA/EFC cells show as blanks. 
Table 6 shows that the proposed rule would lead to significant 
award increases for students with relatively sizable EFCs at medium 
to high COA schools. Although students with EFCs as high as $20,000 
would be eligible for some grant, in fact the combination of relatively 
low need and a low percent of need being met by the award results in 
no awards above $500 to students with EFCs of $11,000 or greater. 
Table 6 also shows, however, that low-EFC students, particularly 
those with $0 EFCs at lower cost schools, would lose substantially 
under the proposed general rule given the specific value of g chosen. 
In the worst case, a $0 EFC student at a school with COA of $4,000 
would see his Pell grant drop from $2,300 to $828, a loss of $1,472 or 
almost two-thirds. 
To put this shift in sharper perspective, under current Pell Grant 
need analysis, a median-income ($30,000) family of four with par-
ents working and no assets would have an EFC of about $1,700. Thus 
this rule change essentially would substantially expand eligibility for 
above-median families at the expense of below-median families. 
Such a significant award reduction for the poorest students seems too 
great to justify the improvements in need targeting. 
The loss of income targeting results mathematically from the 
structure of the general award rule. The percent of need met drops 



















Ratio of Pell Award to Need Using [S- (g-!) (~+~) / (~*+~*)](~-~)Rule 




1000 0.22 0.22 
1500 0.22 0.22 0.22 
2000 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
2500 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 
3000 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 
3500 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 
4000 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 
4500 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 
5000 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
5500 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 
6000 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 
6500 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 
7000 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 
7500 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 
8000 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 
8500 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
9000 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 
9500 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 
10000 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 
10500 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 
11000 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
11500 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 
12000 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 
12500 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0:09 0.09 0.09 
13000 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 009 0.09 0.09 0.08 
13500 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 
14000 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0,07 
14500 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 009 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0,07 
15000 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0,07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
15500 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0,07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
16000 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0,07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
16500 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
17000 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
17500 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 007 0.06 006 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
18000 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 006 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
18500 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
19000 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0,07 007 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 005 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
19500 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0,07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
20000 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 005 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
TABLE6 
Difference Between Pell Awards Calculated Using~-~&: ,e (f-~) Rules and [S- (&-.!> (£+~)I (f"+~*)] (£-!)Rule 
........ Cost Expected Family Contribution 
0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 5500 6000 6500 7000 7500 6000 6500 9000 9500 19000 10500 11000 11500 12000 12500 13000 13500 14000 14500 15000 15500 16000 16500 17000 17500 18000 185011 19000 1!15011 c 0 
:;o 500 
~ 1000 1500 -568 
t-< 2000 -763 -577 
0 2500 -961 -775 -585 
1-yj 3000-1162 -975 -786 
CFl 3500 -1365 -1179 -790 
>-l 4000 -1472 -1086 -696 c 4500 -1381 -995 -606 
v 5000-1294 -907 -518 
t:rJ 5500 -1209 -823 552 z 6000-1127 -741 634 535 
>-l 6500 -1048 ··662 515 713 614 518 
>-rj 7000 -972 -585 591 789 690 594 500 - 7500 -898 -512 665 863 763 667 574 
~ 8000 -828 735 933 834 737 644 553 8500 -760 803 1001 901 805 712 621 533 
(') 9000 -696 867 1065 966 870 776 686 598 513 - 9500 -634 534 929 1127 1028 932 838 748 660 575 > 10000 -575 593 988 1186 1087 990 897 806 719 634 552 t-< 10500 -519 649 1044 1242 1143 1047 953 863 775 690 608 529 
> 11000 702 1097 1295 1196 1100 1006 916 828 743 661 582 506 ,_
11500 753 1148 1346 1246 1150 1057 966 878 794 712 633 556 v 12000 800 1195 1393 1294 1197 1104 1013 926 841 759 680 604 530 
12500 845 1240 1438 1338 1242 1149 1058 970 886 804 725 648 575 505 
13000 886 1281 1479 1380 1284 1190 1100 1012 927 845 766 690 617 546 
13500 533 925 1320 1518 1419 1323 1229 1139 1051 966 884 805 729 656 585 518 
14000 569 961 1356 1554 1455 1358 1265 1174 1087 1002 920 841 765 691 621 553 
14500 602 994 1389 1587 1488 1392 1298 1208 1120 1035 953 874 798 725 654 587 522 
15000 632 1024 1419 1617 1518 1422 1328 1238 1150 1065 983 904 828 755 684 617 552 
15500 659 1052 1447 1645 1545 1449 1356 1265 1177 1093 1011 932 855 782 712 644 579 518 
16000 684 1076 1471 1669 1570 1473 1380 1289 1202 1117 1035 956 880 806 736 668 604 542 
16500 705 1098 1493 1691 1591 1495 1402 1311 1223 1139 1057 978 901 828 758 690 625 564 505 
17000 724 1116 1511 1709 1610 1514 1420 1330 1242 1157 1075 996 920 847 776 709 644 582 523 
17500 740 1132 1527 1725 1626 1530 1436 1346 1258 1173 1091 1012 936 863 792 725 660 598 539 
18000 ~ 1m 1~ 1~ 1m 1ill 1~ ~ 1m 1m 1~ 1m 949 875 805 737 673 611 552 
18500 763 1155 1550 1748 1649 1553 1459 1369 1281 1196 1114 1035 959 886 815 748 683 621 562 506 
19000 770 1162 1557 1755 1656 1560 1466 1376 1288 1203 1121 1042 966 893 822 755 690 628 569 513 
>-' 19500 774 1167 1562 1760 1660 1564 1471 1380 1292 1208 1126 1047 970 897 827 759 694 633 574 518 
-....! 20000 776 1168 1563 1761 1662 1565 1472 1381 1294 1209 1127 1048 972 898 828 760 696 634 575 519 
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the same for every dollar of increase of COA or every dollar of 
increase of EFC. One can imagine, however, a rule under which the 
percent declines in a non-linear way, decreasing more slowly at low 
EFC and low COA values and more rapidly at higher EFC and COA 
values. Figure 2 graphs the percent of need met against C* + E* for 
the generalJ,Ule developed above and for a couple of hand-plotted 
alternatives to illustrate such "non-linear percent" rules. 
Additional work is needed to produce some simple formulas 
that yield this sort of percent-of-need-met curve. Possible candidates 
include suitably transformed trigonometric curves, cubic and higher 
odd-power curves, or (as one reviewer suggested) the logistic 
curve. 19 It is possible that satisfying criteria 1, 3, and 4 with a non-
linear formula may make violation of criterion 2 inescapable. This 
may not be entirely bad; see footnote 2 for further discussion. 
Pell Grant awards are currently calculated as the minimum amount 
generated by three award rules: maximum award minus EFC; COA 
minus EFC; and 60 percent of COA. The lack of analytical attention to 
the impact of these award rules suggested the need for a systematic 
review of how these rules operate. Four general "fairness criteria" 
were developed with which to evaluate any set of award rules. 
Current rules turn out to violate two of the four criteria, with the 
principal culprit being the percent-of-cost rule. Review of alterna-
tives to this rule indicates that replacing the percent-of-cost rule and 
the COA minus· EFC rule with a percent-of-need rule (i.e., a percent 
of the difference between COA and EFC) would remedy these viola-
tions. 
The resulting rules (maximum minus EFC and 60 percent of 
need) are a distinct improvement over current rules but are not 
entirely satisfying. The maximum minus EFC rule is so good at in-
come (i.e., EFC) targeting of grant assistance that need (i.e., COA 
minus EFC) targeting is largely overlooked: many students with need 
but high EFCs receive no assistance whatsoever. 
This led to a not-entirely-successful search for a single general 
rule that would satisfy all of the fairness criteria and improve need-
targeting, without sacrificing too much in the way of income-target-
ing. The specific general rule investigated turned out to require too 
much reduction in income targeting to be desirable. 
Further research and analysis is needed on a variety of fronts to 
help improve the allocation of available Pell Grant resources. First, 
more systematic attention needs to be given to the criteria that Pell 
Grant rules should satisfy. Are additional or different criteria war-
ranted and how do they derive from program goals? 
Second, a broader class of rules needs to be developed and 
investigated. The article hints at one direction for further explora-
tion. Interested financial aid administrators might consider enlisting 
the help of mathematics and economics professors at their institu-
tions, setting the development of optimal Pell Grant award rules as a 
homework problem in appropriate courses. (Perhaps NASFAA could 
sponsor a contest for best award suggestions, with suggestions being 
















Percent of Need Met by Pell Grams 
Under "Linear Percent" and "Non-Linear Percent" Rules 
!0.000 20.000 50,000 10.000 
COA + EFC (whole dollars) 
published as a monograph and awards to be given out at the next 
national conference.) 
Third, any rules that satisfy the formal fairness criteria need to be 
priced out to determine if they are budgetarily feasible and to calcu-
late the implications of budget constraints for rule parameters. 
Development of the requisite estimating tools is crucial if we are to 
understand what the real award rule trade-offs are and improve the 
equity of the distribution of Pell Grant grants. 
Finally, consideration should be given to whether or not Pell-
like award rules should apply to all Title IV subsidies, much as a rule 
similar to the maximum minus EFC was applied to the SEOG pro-
gram in the 1986 Higher Education Act amendments. + 
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Footnotes 
1. Letting A stand for the award and E for the EFC, criterion 1 may thus be expressed as dA/dE < 0, where dis notation 
for taking the derivative. - - -
2. Criterion 2 can thus be expressed as 0 .::5 dA/dC .::5 1, where Cis the COA. An interesting class of award rules, not 
investigated in this paper, would have the charaCteristic that dA/dC-> 0 up to some COA level c• and dA/dC < 0 for all C 
greater than c•. This would create incentives for schools with COA < c• to raise costs but incentives for schools with 
COA > s;:• to lower costs; an indirect form of cost constraint. -
3. Criterion 3 can thus be expressed as d[~/Cs;:- !l_)]/d!!_ .::50. 
4. The attentive reader will notice that any award satisfying criterion 3 will also satisfy criterion 1. To see this, note that 
d[A/(C - E)]/dE = [A + (C - E)(dA/dE)]/(C - E) 2 . If this expression is less than 0, then A + (C - E) 
(ciA/dE) < -0, since (C -_ E) 2 > 0 by definition. since A and c - E are both greater than 0, by definition, dA/dE <-0 
necessarily. Q.E.D. Even though criterion 1 is thus, strictlY speaking:-redundant given criterion 3, we will retain criterion 
1 as a separate rule test for expositional purposes. 
There are no other cases in which satisfying one criterion necessarily satisfies another. It is not true, for example, that 
satisfying criterion 1 satisfies criterion 3, the reverse of the situation just discussed. Consider A= (C- E)12, where 0 < p 
< 1, as a counter-example. In this case dA/dE = -p/(C - E)O- 12) < 0 but d[A/(C-- E)]/dE = (1 - p)(C 
- E)E/(C- E) 2 > 0. - - - - - - - - - -
- Thereader may find it interesting to demonstrate to himself that satisfying criterion 4 does not satisfy criterion 2, 
even though the correspondence appears at first glance to be parallel to the relation of criterion 3 to criterion 1. Indeed, 
as the reader will find, satisfying criterion 4 in fact puts an upper bound on ~/ds;: in criterion 2 of yes;:- !l_). 
5. Criterion 4 can thus be expressed as d[yCs;:- !l_)]/ds;: .::5 0. 
6. Technically, because of the minimum award rule, no student with an EFC greater than the maximum minus the 
minimum can get an award. However, as noted, we are abstracting from any implications of the minimum award rule 
here. 
7. That is, d(pC)/d!l_ = 0, where again 0 < E < 1. 
8. That is, d(M- E)/dC = 0. 
- - -
9. That is, d[pC/Cs;:- !!_)]/d.§_= ~/Cs;:- !l_) 2 > 0. 
10. That is, d[Cs;:- !l_)/Cs;:- !l_)]/d!l_ = 0. 
11. In general, Ca- !)/(~ p < g/~ if~> g >! > 0. 
12. Since~= 0 for !l_ 2::: _!li, d[YCs;:- !l_]/d!l_ = 0 for !l_ 2::: _!li. 
13. That is, d(pc E)/dE= -1. 
14. That is, d[(~- !l_)/Cs;: .§.)]/d.!::= -(1 E)s;:/Cs;:- E) 2 < o. 
15. That is, d[(~ .!::)/Cs;:- .§.)]Ids;:= (1 -E) yes;:- !l.) 2 > o. 
16. That is, d[ECs;:- !l_)]/d!l_ = -p. 
17. That is, d{[ECs;:- !l_)J!Cs;:- !l_) l/d.!:: = 0 and d{[ECs;:- !l_)J/(~- !l_l/ds;: = 0. 
18. That is: 
(1) dA/dE = (g[2E- (C* + E*)]- 21Ej/(C* + E* < 0; 
(2) ~~d~ = @c~· + ~·) --29 + 2~1/c* + !l.*) > o; 
(3) d[A/(C E)]/dE = -(g- 1)/(C* + E*) < 0; and 
(4) d[~/(~- ~)]/d~ = -(g })/(~· + §_•) < 0. 
19. The logistic curve is a modified formula for growth at compound interest sometimes used to predict population 
growth. The general formula isy= Q/(R + ST!!.'>), where Q, R, S, T,and Uare constants and where Q, R, and S are often 1, 
Tis usually e, the basis of naturallogarithmS';-and U is usuallY<: 0. In recent years, the formula hasaiSo come to be used 
in certain types of econometric applications. -
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